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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY ADOPTED To OVERCOME DEFENDANT
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IN DES LITIGATION
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980)
The Supreme Court of California in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
sidestepped a major obstacle to recovery for Diethylstilbestrol (DES)2
victims 3 by adopting a market share liability exception4 to the defend-
ant identification requirement5 that is essential to recovery in products
1. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
2. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a synthetic estrogen first approved by the Federal Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) in 1947. In 1952, the FDA declared DES not to be a "new" drug and gener-
ally recognized it as safe under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938,21 U.S.C. § 321
(p)(l) (1976). 26 Cal. 3d at 593, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. Currently, physicians use
DES primarily in the treatment of female disorders, including menopausal disturbances, senile
vaginitis, amenorrhea, dysmennorhea, functional uterine bleeding, and as a therapy in restoring
menstrual rhythm. R. PATTERSON & H. MORSE, MALPRACTICE AND PRODUCT LIABILITY Ac-
TIONS INVOLVING DRUGS 86 (1976). DES has also been proposed as a contraceptive "morning
after" pill. M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 11:27 (1979).
3. Typically, a pregnant mother ingested the drug to prevent miscarriage, thereby exposing
the plaintiff in utero. Henderson, DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 CORP. L.
REv. 143 (1980). In 1971 it was reported that administration of DES to pregnant women in-
creased the risk of vaginal adenocarcinoma in the female offspring. See M. DIXON, supra note 2,
at § 11:27 (citing Herbst, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol her-
apy With Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971)). Any effects in
male children remain uncertain. See Charfoos, DES: Bitter Aftermath of a Pill, I1 TRIAL 71
(1975). As a result the FDA effectively banned the drug for use during pregnancy because of its
danger and ineffectiveness as a miscarriage preventative. Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory
of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966 nn.l I & 12 (1978). Prenatal DES exposure
has caused injury to a large class of potential plaintiffs. Already an estimated eighty to one hun-
dred DES cases are pending against the major drug companies. Id at 963. Defendants in the
Sindell case have been made parties to nearly seventy similar actions. Petitioner's Brief for Certi-
orari at 9, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). If found liable the
drug companies could face future damages in the billions of dollars. Comment, supra at 968.
4. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This exception is discussed in
notes 45-109 infra and accompanying text. The court relied primarily on the theory of enterprise
liability proposed in Comment, supra note 3, in forming this exception. 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 609
n.25, 612 & n.28, 607 P.2d at 934, 935 n.25, 937 & n.28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 143 n.25, 145 & n.28;
see also 26 Cal. 3d at 621, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dissenting);
Comment, supra note 3, at 394.
5. Regardless of the theory which liability is predicated upon, whether negligence,
breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, or other grounds, it is obvious that to hold a
producer, manufacturer, or seller liable for injury caused by a particular product, there
must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufactured, sold, or was in some way
responsible for the product ....
Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1349 (1973). See 1 R. HuRSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PROD-
ucTs LIABILTrr § 1.41 at 125 (2d ed. 1974); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 301, 338 (1961).
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liability actions.6
Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought suit against eleven drug companies7
on behalf of herself and similarly situated women. Sindell alleged that
the administration of DES to her mother during pregnancy resulted in
plaintiff's development of cancerous and precancerous tumors.' Plain-
tiff was unable to identify9 the specific manufacturer of the drug taken
by her mother because of the time lapse between ingestion of the drug
and discovery of plaintiffs injuries."0 The trial court sustained the de-
fendants' demurrers because plaintiff failed to identify the culpable
6. Identification of defendant as manufacturer of an injury causing product is an indispen-
sable element in a products liability suit. I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 5, § 1.41 at 125.
See note 5 supra. See generalo , O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973);
Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co. v. Childress, 277 Ala. 285, 169 So. 2d 305 (1964). For cases
finding insufficient identification of the defendant, see Miller v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 142 Cal.
App. 2d 109, 297 P.2d 1024 (1956); McDonough v. General Motors Corp., 6 Mich. App. 239, 148
N.W.2d 911 (1967); Rockett v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 460 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App. 1970); Welsh v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, 380 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
7. The DES manufacturers sued by plaintiffs Judith Sindell and Maureen Rogers repre-
sented a substantial share of the DES market. 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
132. The plaintiffs' actions were joined at the appellate level, and discussion of both actions is
based on the Sindell fact pattern. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138
(1978), discussed in Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in Caliornia: .t The Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REv.
497, 514 n.103 (1979).
8. Plaintiff Sindell sought compensatory and punitive damages for precancerous tumors of
the vagina, cervix, and breast, and for a malignant tumor of the bladder allegedly caused by
prenatal exposure to DES. 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (1978). The first cause of action alleged that
defendants were "jointly and individually negligent in that they manufactured, marketed, and
promoted DES. . . without adequate testing or warning." 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 134. Other causes of action charged defendants with collaboration in testing and
placing the drug on the market, violation of express and implied warranties, false and fraudulent
misrepresentation, misbranding of drugs, conspiracy, and "lack of consent." Id at 595, 607 P.2d
at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
9. Both Sindell and Rogers originally filed complaints which did not specifically identify the
manufacturer of the injury causing drug. Sindell failed to amend her complaint because she could
not identify the DES manufacturer. Rogers amended her complaint, alleging that Eli Lilly & Co.
had manufactured the drug used by her mother. The court's discussion in Sindell therefore ap-
plies to Rogers only if plaintiff Rogers fails to establish the identity of the proper defendant. 26
Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
10. Obvious difficulties arise for a DES victim in attempting to identify the particular brand
of DES administered to her mother. Approximately 300 United States manufacturers produced
DES to prevent miscarriage. Henderson, supra note 3, at 147. See also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94
Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Comment, supra note 3, at 964 n.3. The Sindell court
estimated that 200 DES manufacturers might have made the product that injured the plaintiff. 26
Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Despite the large number of manufacturers,
Eli Lilly & Co. and five or six other manufacturers controlled 90% of the DES market. Comment,
supra note 3, at 977. See also B. SEAMAN & G. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND CRSIS IN SEx HORMONES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/10
Number 2] MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
manufacturer. 1 The Supreme Court of California reversed, in a 4-3
decision," and held: When plaintiffs cannot identify the specific manu-
facturer of the drug that caused their injuries, each manufacturer of a
substantial percentage of the generically identical drug is liable for its
proportionate share of the market. Any defendant who can prove that
it did not manufacture the drug that caused plaintiff's injuries will be
absolved from liability. 3
Since the advent of products liability law, 14 courts have imposed lia-
bility on a manufacturer for harm caused by a defective product1 5 only
33 (1977). Diethylstilbestrol was marketed under approximately seventy trade names but was
most commonly referred to by its generic name, DES. M. DIXON, supra note 2, at § 9:09.
It is not unreasonable, therefore, that DES mothers have difficulty in remembering the name of
the manufacturer of a drug they took almost thirty years before discovering its carcinogenic pro-
pensity. See Comment, supra note 3, at 972. The loss or destruction of pharmaceutical or medical
records identifying the manufacturers compounds the problem of identification. Id at 972 n.26;
Note, Industry- Wide Liabiliy, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 980, 999 (1979). See also Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. at 67, 289
N.W.2d at 22 (1980).
11. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories., No. C 169127 (Super. Ct., L.A. County); No. 61220
(Super. Ct., Ventura County); see 26 Cal. 3d at 596, 607 P.2d at 926-27, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
The court of appeals specified two theories on which liability might be imposed. The court
accepted both the concert of action theory and the alternative liability theory in shifting the bur-
den of proof of causation to the defendants in Sindell. 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978). See notes 27-39
infra. The California Supreme Court discussed and criticized both of these theories. 26 Cal. 3d at
598, 607, 607 P.2d at 928, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 141.
12. Id at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
13. Id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Traditional tort doctrine places the burden on the plaintiff of proving that the tortious conduct
of the defendant caused the harm to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(l)
(1965). "A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of
pure speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the
duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant." Id at § 433B(l), comment a. See Ruther-
ford v. Modern Bakery, 310 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1958); Tombigbee Elec. Power Ass'n v. Gandy, 216
Miss. 444, 62 So. 2d 567 (1953); Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 388 Pa. 419, 130 A.2d 445 (1957);
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 241 (4th ed. 1971).
14. The English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842),
is generally regarded to represent the birth of products liability law. W. PROSSER, supra note 14,
at 641; Note, supra note 10, at 980 n.l. For a brief synopsis of the early development of products
liability law, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 744-52 (1956); Note, supra note
10, at 980-97.
15. The Restatement of Torts states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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on proof that defendant actually manufactured the product in ques-
tion. 16 The identification requirement is also essential to prove causa-
tion 17  in negligence, 18  breach of warranty, 19  and strict liability
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relationship with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement appears to have adopted the
strict liability theory of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963), discussed in note 20 infra.
16. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
It goes without saying that if a drug manufacturer, druggist, or other seller of drugs is to
be held liable for harm caused by such a product, it is necessary to show that the drug
was one with which the defendant is identified in the respect asserted-that is, it must be
shown that the defendant actually manufactured, compounded, or sold the drug or
medicine in question.
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 301, 338 (1961). See also KarIjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d
155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestos case with fact pattern similar to Sindell); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (same); Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (burden of proof of causation on plaintiff in drug
product liability case); Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (failure to estab-
lish defendant as manufacturer of DES that plaintiffs mother had taken during pregnancy); Dum-
brow v. Ettinger, 44 F. Supp. 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (failure to establish defendant as seller of injury
producing liver extract); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1978) (failure to identify adequately one of multiple manufacturers of DES).
17. When manufacturers and designers are held strictly liable in tort for their defective prod-
ucts, the following elements of the case must be present:
(1) [The product is placed on the market;
(2) [T]here is knowledge it will be used without inspection for defect;
(3) [The product proves to have a defect; and
(4) [IThe defect causes injury to a human being.
Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (1976) (citing Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
"Inherent in that liability thesis is the proposition that the identity of the manufacturer must be
ascertained and proved." McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 83, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730,
734. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 236; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negli-
gence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1962).
18. The elements of a cause of action in negligence are:
(1) A duty requiring an actor to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others
against unreasonable risks.
(2) A failure to conform to the standard required.
(3) A causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.
(4) Actual loss or damage to another.
W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1971). In
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), Justice Cardozo eliminated
the need for privity of contract between the contractor and the injured plaintiff for injuries caused
by defective products. When a product that is negligently made is dangerous to the user, the
manufacturer owes a duty to all foreseeable users. Id at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. See Note, supra
note 10, at 988.
19. With the advent of consumer reaction to injuries from defective food in 1905, a hybrid
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actions.20  Because of increasing industrialization in the last century,
the judiciary developed three major exceptions2 to the identification
requirement to protect consumers' rights:22 concert of action,23 alterna-
tive liability,2" and enterprise liability.25
The prima facie concert of action case requires proof that multiple
actors26 pursued a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.27
tort/contract action known as breach of warranty developed. Like negligence, it shed the require-
ment of privity of contract, see note 18 supra, and finally developed into an action of strict liabil-
ity, see note 20 infra. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Back v. Wickes Corp.,
378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978); Prosser, The Assault Uon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134
(1960).
20. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963), Justice Traynor finalized the transition of breach of warranty actions into strict liability.
See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Strict
liability in tort is accepted by at least two thirds of the courts and has been incorporated into the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965). But see McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal.
App. 3d 77, 87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733 (1978); W. PRossER, supra note 14, at 656. See generally
M. DIXON, supra note 2, at § 9:06.
21. These three exceptions are discussed extensively in Sindell. See 26 Cal. 3d 588, 598-609,
607 P.2d 924, 928-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136-43.
22. Justice Traynor's famous dissent in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944), summarizes the courts' recognition of the need to protect consumers' rights:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its conse-
quences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is
to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a
menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to
the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is
responsible for its reaching the market.
Id at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
23. See notes 26-31 infra.
24. See notes 30-39 infra.
25. See notes 40-54 infra.
26. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (defendants shooting in plaintiff's
direction); Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967) (same); Bierczynski v.
Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968) (participating in drag race); Moses v. Town of Morganton, 192
N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926) (polluting environment); Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or. 354, 397 P.2d 784
(1964) (participating in drag race); Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251,
248 S.W.2d 731 (1952) (polluting environment). See also Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106
N.W. 1120 (1906); Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852,
110 So. 666 (1927).
27. See Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 667, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (citing W. PRos-
SER, LAW OF TORTS 258 (3d ed. 1964)).
The actors must have furthered the commission of a tort through their own actions, by cooper-
ating with or encouraging another wrongdoer. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 293; see notes 8-
10 supra and accompanying text. Conspiracy is often used as a synonym for concert of action in
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The agreement among the parties may be inferred from the actors'
knowledge of the commission of tortious acts2" if a tacit understanding
to commit these acts existed among the parties.29 The tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for all damage to the plaintiff.3" The identi-
fication requirement in the concert of action case is relaxed when the
court imposes liability on the group, rather than on the individual
wrongdoer.3 The practical difficulty of apportioning damages among
cases of vicarious liability. See W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 293. The elements of a conspiracy
are:
(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy;
(2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and
(3) the damage resulting therefrom.
Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 631,498 P.2d 1063, 1074, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 830 (1972).
See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182 (1978). The following cases add "cooperation" and "encouragement" to the elements of a
conspiracy to form the theory of concert of action: Weirum v. R.K.O. General, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539
P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975) (encouraging dangerous conduct of others); Weinberg v. Bixby,
185 Cal. 87, 196 P. 25 (1921) (participating in wrongful diversion of flood waters); Agovino v.
Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960) (aiding and abetting); Meyer v. Thomas, 18
Cal. App. 2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176 (1936) (participating in an illegal transfer of trust); Loeb v. Kim-
merle, 215 Cal. 143, 9 P.2d 199 (1932) (encouraging and enticing).
The Restatement incorporates the aiding and abetting rule into § 876:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is
liable if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing the tortious result, consti-
tuting a breach of duty to that third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876(b)(c) (1934). The provision was specifically applied in Pasadena
Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41,
49 (1977).
28. See Nelson v. Nason, 343 Mass. 220, 177 N.E.2d 887 (1961); Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or.
354, 397 P.2d 784 (1964); W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 292 (citing Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239
A.2d 218 (Del. 1968)). See also Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1970) (citing Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 431-40 (1967)).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 292. Although this theory was developed to prevent tor-
tious conspiracies and not specifically as an exception to the identification requirement, the con-
cert of action concept deals with the same underlying problems of causation among the parties
acting in concert and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Id at 293 n.17 (citing P. WINFIELD,
HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY Ch. 11 (1921)). But see Comment, supra note 3, at 979-80 (criticism of
the two explanations supporting concert of action). See generally Green, supra note 17, at 548-61.
30. The defendants may, however, receive contribution from other tortfeasors. See Caldwell
v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 231 N.W.2d 46 (1975); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liabilily, 25 CALIF.
L. REV. 413 (1937). Even if defendants caused no injury, they become liable for the injuries
caused by fellow tortfeasors because they all acted jointly. See Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106
N.W. 1120 (1906).
31. If all of the defendants materially contribute to the commission of a tort within the
description of concert of activity, and are held jointly and severally liable, identification of the
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tortfeasors initially results in imposition of the entire loss on each de-
fendant.32 If a logical basis for apportionment exists, however, an ap-
proximate division of damages among defendants may occur.33
The courts developed the alternative liability theory to overcome
identification problems inherent in tort cases.34 All potential defend-
specific wrongdoer will not be necessary for recovery, and the entire group will be liable. See note
26 supra and accompanying text. Although use of the theory may have initial appeal to the DES
plaintiff attempting to impose liability on a "conspiracy" of drug manufacturers, the California
Court of Appeals severely criticized use of the concert of action theory in DES cases because of
the complicated fact pattern, evidentiary problems in proving concert, and the arbitrary choice of
only a few manufacturers.
[The concert of action theory deals] with cases of known concerted activity where the
sole uncertainty was not whether the defendant had in some way acted so as to contrib-
ute to the injury, but rather whether the defendant's difficulty in apportioning responsi-
bility would preclude the innocent claimant's recovery. In those cases the defendant was
known to have engaged in concerted activity by either shooting in the direction of the
plaintiff, polluting the environment, or participating in a drag race on a public roadway.
McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 85-86, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 735-36 (1978) (re-
jecting theory in DES cases). In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 50 A.D.2d 90,376 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1979,
however, a jury found in the plaintiffs favor despite her inability to fulfill the identification re-
quirement. But see Henderson, supra note 2, at 145; Comment, supra note 3, at 980-85. At least
one court allowed concert of action to overcome defendant's demurrers at the pleading stage.
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980). Another court certified a class
action, noting that concert of action will be one of plaintiff's primary arguments. Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 314-15 n.27.
The liability of two defendants who act in concert is somewhat similar to the liability
of partners or the liability of principal and agent-the plaintiff may recover his entire
claim against either of the tortfeasors. Much the same thing is true where two tortfeasors
act independently, rather than in concert, if their actions combine to produce a single
injury in the plaintiff. between them there may be contribution or indemnity, but so far
as the plaintiff is concerned, they are not entitled to limit their liability to some percent-
age of the plaintiff's damages.
D. DOas, REMEDES 215 (1973). See Machado v. Katcher Meat Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 1, 237
P.2d 715 (1951); Eidson v. Maddox, 195 Ga. 641, 24 S.E.2d 895 (1943); Hoesel v. Cain, 222 Ind.
330, 53 N.E.2d 165 (1944); Walker v. Vail, 203 Md. 321, 101 A.2d 201 (1953); Briley v. Austad, 108
N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 1961).
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 314 n.20.
The question is primarily not one of the facts of causation, but of the feasibility and
practical convenience of splitting up the total harm into separate parts which may be
attributed to each of two or more causes. Where a logical basis can be found for some
rough practical apportionment, which limits a defendant's liability to that part of the
harm which he has in fact caused, it may be expected that the division will be made.
Id at 313-14.
34. "There is one special type of situation in which the usual rule that the burden of proof as
to causation has been relaxed. It may be called that of clearly established double fault and alter-
native liability." Id at 243.
The alternative liability theory . . . involves not a joint tort, but rather, involves in-
dependent acts by two or more tortfeasors, all of whom acted wrongfully, but only one of
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ants must be joined in an alternative liability action to prevent the true
wrongdoer from escaping liability." In Summers v. Tice,36 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff's two hunting companions negligently fired shotguns
simultaneously. A single pellet damaged plaintiff's eye. Only one of
the defendants' shots was responsible for the wound, but plaintiff could
not possibly identify the particular gun that caused the injury." The
Summers court reasoned that when only one actor injured a plaintiff,
compensation will not be denied because plaintiff cannot establish
which of two equally culpable defendants was responsible for the in-
jury.3 8
The courts, in products liability decisions, 39 have cautiously em-
braced both the alternative liability and the concert of action theories
to overcome the identification hurdle in DES cases. A Michigan court
of appeals in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co. I accepted the alternative liability
theory to dismiss DES manufacturers' demurrers.4 Because plaintiffs
whom has injured plaintiff. Joint and several liability is imposed, not because all are
responsible for the damage, but because it is impossible to tell which one is responsible.
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1980). See notes 36-44 infra.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3), comment h (1965).
36. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
37. Id See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 2d 91, 98, 100 (1948). The authors of the Restatement have
adopted the Summers rule:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been
caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has
caused it, the burden is upon such actor to prove he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
38. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. Some courts will not extend Summers to cases in which all
tortfeasors are not joined. See Shunk v. Bosworth, 334 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1964); Smith v. Ameri-
cania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1974); Eley v. Curzon, 121 Cal. App. 2d
280, 263 P.2d 86 (1953).
Summers addresses the earlier controversial decision of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154
P.2d 687 (1944), which formulated the alternative liability theory more broadly than Summers.
In Ybarra the plaintiff awoke from an appendectomy with a paralyzed shoulder. Unable to
identify a reason for the injury, plaintiff brought suit against the six doctors and nurses attending
the operation on the presumption that at least one had caused the injury. Each defendant was
present at the time of the cause of the injury, and therefore under the doctrine ofres sa loquitur,
all of the defendants were liable for the negligence of one actor. 25 Cal. at 488, 154 P.2d at 688.
See also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 598, 599, 607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
137.
39. Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). Contra,
Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d
868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
40. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
41. Female DES victims and their husbands brought suit for damages against seventeen DES
manufacturers. Their amended complaint alleged causes of action under both the concert of ac-
tion theory and the alternative liability theory for negligence in testing, manufacturing, and dis-
[Vol. 59:571
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bear a heavy burden in proving that each defendant breached a duty of
care in marketing DES, the court refused to require plaintiffs to appor-
tion the damages among defendants.42 The Abel court thus shifted the
burden of dividing liability to proven wrongdoers43 after plaintiff es-
tablished the manufacturers' culpability.44
The theory of enterprise liability,45 which is designed to aid the
plaintiff who cannot identify the manufacturer of an injurious prod-
UCt,46 is a hybrid of the concert of action and alternative liability theo-
tributing the drug. Plaintiffs alleged that all of the known manufacturers whose products were
distributed in Michigan during the relevant time period were joined as defendants. Some of the
plaintiffs were unable to discover the specific manufacturer of the drug that caused their harm
because of the destruction of pharmaceutical records.
42. Plaintiffs in the case at bar bear a heavy, perhaps.. . insuperable, burden of proof,
one made even more difficult by the number of defendants and the [long period before
discovery of the injuries]. They must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
each defendant breached its duty of care in producing the product, that the harm to each
plaintiff was the result of ingestion of DES by her mother, and that one or more of the
named defendants manufactured the DES so ingested. Each plaintiff must carry her
burden as to these defendants in order to recover.
94 Mich. App. at 76-77, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
43. Id at 73-74, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
44. Id at 75, 289 N.W.2d at 26. See Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 614, 271
N.W.2d 777 (1978); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
45. Enterprise liability can be described as a deliberate assignment of risk to specific
individuals or groups because they are in the best position to eliminate the risks or to
self-insure by spreading the cost of the risks not eliminated. The risks assigned are those
viewed as typical or calculable and thus can be treated as cost items. These concepts
have been used to justify the first applications of strict products liability, as well as later
extensions to other members of the manufacturing-distribution chain.
Note, Products Liability--Enterrle Liability--Entire Industry May be Liable f aImpossible to Iden-
tifyActual Manufacturer ofDefective Product, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1299, 1306 (1973). See also
Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 CoLo. L. REv. 153, 158-64 (1976).
46. See note 45 supra. The elements of enterprise liability expand traditional bases of liabil-
ity in tort law while restricting the theory's scope to products liability cases. One commentator
proposes the following elements of enterprise liability:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent and such liabil-
ity is due to the nature of the defendant's conduct.
2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiffs injury was caused by the
product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants accounted
for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the time of plaintiff's
injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of safety as to the manufacture
of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever cause of
action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liability.
Comment, supra note 3, at 995.
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ries.47 The court in Hall v. El du Pont de Nemours48 first imposed the
concept of enterprise liability4 9 on a group of manufacturers of dyna-
mite blasting caps for injuries caused by the product, even though
plaintiff could not identify the culpable manufacturer.50 The theory
assigns the burden of proof of causation 5' to a group of blameworthy
manufacturers 52 who assume calculable risks in marketing certain
products53 as a cost of doing business.54 The theory requires the identi-
fication of defendants that are both capable of bearing the cost of the
damages55 and sufficiently culpable to warrant not only the shifting of
proof of causation, but also the apportioning of the damages among
them.5 6 The ultimate distribution of cost hopefully achieves an effi-
cient and proper use of society's resources to compensate the injured
victim.57 The theory, although attractive to some scholars5" and plain-
tiffs,59 has not been accepted widely by courts in DES cases. 60
47. Id.
Enterprise liability as proposed here combines the better features of concert and alterna-
tive liability into one coherent theory. It can result in the joint and several liability of all
the industry members that manufactured an identically defective product. The theory
would be available to plaintiffs who cannot or might not be able to identify the actual
causative agent of their injury.
Id
48. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
49. The Sindell court employs the term "suggested" because of the uncertain position of Hall
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), as authority. 26 Cal.3d at 607
n.22, 607 P.2d at 934 n.22, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.22.
50. Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Hall consolidated
two cases in which six explosives manufacturers were held liable for accidents in which children
were severely injured by exploding blasting caps. Evidence demonstrating the identity of the re-
sponsible manufacturer was destroyed in the explosion.
51. See note 45 supra.
52. See Note, supra note 10, at 983.
The essence of the industry-wide liability [enterprise liability] theory is a shift in the
burden of proof on the identification issue from the plaintiff to the manufacturers. The
shift would occur if the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, is unable to identify the
manufacturer of an injury-causing product but can demonstrate other factors common to
a group of manufacturers of products similar to the injury-causing product.
Id (footnotes omitted).
53. See note 45 supra.
54. Id This may have the undesirable effect of causing manufacturers to leave defects in a
product if the cost in removing them exceeds the cost of paying products liability claims. Camp-
bell, Enterprise Liability-Adustrtent of Priorities, 10 FORUM 1231, 1235 (1975).
55. Klemme, supra note 45, at 183-84.
56. Id
57. Id at 184-91.
58. The most notable are Klemme, supra note 45, and the author of Comment, supra note 3.
59. See Note, supra note 10, at 1001-06.
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The Supreme Court of California in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories6
rejected these three exceptions to the identification requirement,6" and
based its judgment on a new theory: market share liability. 3 The
court first addressed the alternative liability theory,' which would shift
plaintiff's burden of proof even though defendants did not have greater
access to the injury causing information.6 5 The Sindell court did not
interpret Summers to require that defendant possess the information,
but only that the knowledge be accessible to defendants.6 The court
noted, however, that if defendant establishes it did not manufacture the
specific DES taken by plaintiff's mother, it will be dismissed from the
action.67 The court rejected the alternative liability theory," however,
because it is possible that none of the five defendants manufactured the
injury-causing DES.69
The Sindell court dismissed plaintiff's contention that a concert of
action70 existed among the defendant manufacturers in developing,
testing, and marketing DES. 7 The plaintiff did not allege a tacit un-
derstanding among the manufacturers in producing DES,72 but stated
that defendants produced the drug from an identical formula in adher-
ence with guidelines of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act73 and com-
mon practice of industry.7 4 The court held that to apply the concert of
action theory would impose liability on individual manufacturers for
the products of an entire industry, despite a showing that a defendant
did not produce the particular drug that caused plaintiff's injuries."
60. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
61. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
62. Id at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 935-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
63. See notes 98-108 infra. See generally Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the
DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1981).
64. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
65. Id at 600, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
66. Id at 600-02, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
67. Id at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
68. The court cited Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1978). In Garcia only one of two defendants was a wrongdoer and plaintiffs inability to establish
the identity of the wrongdoer resulted in a judgment for the defendants.
69. 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
70. Id at 604-05, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
71. Id
72. Id at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 351, (b) (1976). See note 2 supra.
74. 26 Cal. 3d at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
75. Id, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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The majority rejected the theory of enterprise liability76 enunciated
in Hall v. EL. du Pont de Nemours.7 7 First, the Hall court imposed
liability on a small number of manufacturers representing an entire in-
dustry,78 and warned that application of the enterprise liability theory
to a decentralized industry with a large number of manufacturers
would be "manifestly unreasonable. 79 Second, defendants in Hall re-
lied on a trade association to guard against the foreseeable risks inher-
ent in their industry, 0 while plaintiffs in Sindell failed to allege a
similar concerted delegation of authority.8' Finally, because the Hall
majority recognized that the Food and Drug Administration, which
sets testing and marketing standards for new drugs, controls the drug
industry, 2 DES manufacturers who follow criteria stricter than com-
mon industry practice should not be held accountable for plaintiffs' in-
juries.8 3
The California Supreme Court, however, did not limit its decision to
the three identification requirement exceptions.84 The court modified
the most persuasive arguments of Summers,85 applied the arguments to
the enterprise theory of Hall,86 and proposed its own market share lia-
bility theory87 to overcome defendants' demurrers.8  The market share
liability theory ensures both the likelihood that joined defendants pro-
vided the injurious product, and that the specific wrongdoer will not
76. Id at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
77. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
78. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
79. 345 F. Supp. at 378.
80. Id
81. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
85. "As between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of the injury." Id
86. 1d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
87. Id at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
88. The court failed to consider several legislative and judicial attempts to provide alternative
compensation for DES victims without expanding products liability law in the manner of market
share liability. These alternatives include: Creation of a manufacturers' insurance fund for future
DES related injuries to members of a class action, Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 76-1514-8
(D. Mass., filed Jan. 30, 1980); prevention of exclusionary policies in various health care and
disability plans towards DES victims, Ch. 776 §§ 1-7, 1980 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 439 (Cal. Sen.
Bill No. 1392, enacted July, 1980); and limited no-fault products liability insurance, Note, supra
note 10, at 1019-21. See generally Merrill, Compensation For rescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L.
REv. 1, 107 (1973).
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escape liability. 9 A particular defendant may be excluded from an ac-
tion by proving that it could not have manufactured the product that
caused plaintiff's injuries.90 Remaining defendants may file cross-com-
plaints against others not joined in the action to equitably distribute
liability throughout the industry.91 The Sindell court maintains that
each manufacturer's ultimate liability for injuries caused by its produc-
tion of DES under the market share theory would approximate the por-
tion of damages caused by its product.92
When the Sindell court attempted to develop a market share liability
theory to relieve the plaintiff's identification burden, it created a flawed
and untenable doctrine. The problem lies in the theory's abrogation of
the Summers and Hall requirement that all possible defendants be
joined in an action to shift the burden of proof of causation.93 The
market share theory requires *only that plaintiffs name manufacturers
representing a substantial share of the relevant market. 94 "Substantial
share" is an undefined term that infers something less than a seventy-
five percent share of the appropriate market.95 The Sindell dissent il-
lustrates that the substantial share is an aggregate of the individual
shares of independent manufacturers who occupy only a small portion
of the relevant market.96 An individual defendant may be held propor-
tionately liable for injuries caused by a particular product that it proba-
bly did not produce.97
The tortfeasor can escape liability, under Sindell, if it is not joined in
the action. Although the court suggests that joined defendants may im-
plead other possible defendants,9" all the liability will fall originally on
the joined defendants. Some manufacturers will either be outside the
89. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
90. Id
91. Id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
92. Id at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
93. See note 39 supra.
94. 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
95. The court states that "while 75 to 80 percent of the market is suggested as the requirement
by the FoRw1LAM Comment (at p. 996), we hold only that a substantial percentage is required."
id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 996.
96. 26 Cal. 3d at 615-16, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. Defendants also may seek contribution
from other manufacturers in order to evenly spread the costs of damages. See Gregory, Contribu-
tion Among Joint Torqfeasors: 4 Defense, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1170 (1941).
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jurisdiction of California courts99 or no longer in business."°° Other
states may not accept the market share theory,' 0' which will cause an
uneven distribution of costs."0 2 Problems of proof relating to market
share data 0 3 emphasize that the ultimate assignment of liability will be
based arbitrarily on the conjecture of the court.
Problems associated with the rule will not be limited to DES manu-
facturers.'" The Sindell dissent criticizes the rule as a future imposi-
tion of liability "exceed[ing] absolute liability," opening the door to a
substantial increase in the volume of products liability suits.' 0 5 The
effect of a holding that guarantees plaintiffs will prevail on the causa-
tion issue at trial because remaining defendants will be incapable of
disputing allegations that they manufactured the cause of plaintiff's in-
juries is an immediate concern to DES manufacturers."°
The majority, in developing a new theory, upheld the court's power
to declare policy, rather than allowing the legislature to resolve the is-
sue.'0 7 Similarly, the court did not discuss alternate modes of compen-
sation for victims of defective products.'08 Although the need for
compensating the DES victim is clear, the court's theory drastically al-
ters basic postulates of products liability law.'1 9
99. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148. (Richardson, J., dissenting)
("such a defendant may or may not be either solvent or amenable to process").
100. Id, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
101. See note 31 supra.
102. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Additionally, it is readily apparent that "market share" liability will fall unevenly and
disproportionately upon those manufacturers who are amenable to suit in California.
On the assumption that no other state will adopt so radical a departure from traditional
tort principles, it may be concluded that under the majority's reasoning those defendants
who are brought to trial in this state will bear effective joint responsibility for 100 percent
of plaintiffs' injuries despite the fact that their "substantial" aggregate market share may
be considerably less. This undeniable fact forces the majority to concede that, "a de-
fendant may be held liable for a somewhat different percentage of the damage than its
share of the appropriate market would justify."
Id
103. Id, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
104. Comment, supra note 3, at 1007; Note, supra note 10, at 1001-02.
105. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (citing Note, supra note 10, at
998).
106. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
107. See note 23 supra. The California legislature has taken some steps for DES victims, but
as one commentator points out, the answer to the DES victims' problems may lie in limited no-
fault insurance, which could be imposed on manufacturers by the legislature. See Note, supra
note 10, at 1015-22.
108. See note 88 supra.
109. See notes 109-22 supra; Note, supra note 10, at 1022.
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